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The Congressional Subpoena: Power, Limitations 
and Witness Protection* 
Christopher F. Carr** 
Gregory J. Spak *** 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, Congress has made substantial use of 
the Congressional subpoena, liberally invoking its authority to 
compel witnesses to testify and produce documents in hearings 
such as the high-profile savings & loan/ Housing and Urban 
Development,2 Iran-Contra3 and Bank of Commerce and 
Credit International (BCCI)4 scandals. This Congressional 
authority is a fundamental underpinning of Congress' critical 
constitutional oversight, investigative, and legislative 
functions. 5 However, society has a valid interest in ensuring 
* The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone. The 
authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Joseph Fischer in the preparation 
of this article. 
** Attorney, Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon, Washington, D.C.; BA 
1983, the Pennsylvania State University; JD 1986, George Washington University 
National Law Center. 
*** Attorney, Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon, Washington, D.C.; 
B.S.F.S. 1984, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; JD 1987, 
Georgetown University Law Center. 
1. Richard Walker, Governors Call for Independent Inquiry of Thrifts Crisis, 
REUTER BUS. REP. July 31, 1990. 
2. Philip Shendon, Immunity is Seen as Possible for 2 Top H.U.D. Figures, But 
Not Pierce, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1989, at A12. 
3. Ronald L. Goldfarb, In Contempt, WASH. PoST, July 8, 1987, at A19; 
Haynes Johnson & Tracy Thompson, North Charges Dismissed at Request of 
Prosecutor, WASH. POST, Sept.17, 1991, at Al. 
4. Jim McGee, Clifford, Altman Offer Own View of BCCI Data, WASH. PoST, 
Aug. 31, 1991, at A15. 
5. Allen B. Moreland, Congressional Investigations and the Private Person, 40 
S. CAL. L. REV. 189, 216-25 (1967) [hereafter Moreland]. See also Tom Kenworthy, 
Special Counsel Drops Charges Against North in Iran-Contra Affair, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 17, 1991, at A16. Senator Foley (D-Wash) who served on the Investigation 
Committee for the Iran-Contra Affair, stated that "there is an important role that 
37 
38 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 6 
that there are clear limits on Congress' subpoena authority to 
protect individuals and entities who find themselves subject to 
this immense and somewhat nebulous Congressional fiat. 
The tension between Congress' right to investigate and the 
individual's right to privacy and due process of law is the 
subject of the following discussion. The article begins by 
examining the Congressional rules implementing Congress' 
power to subpoena witnesses and documents (Section 1), and by 
reviewing the few structural limitations on Congress' broad 
subpoena power (Section II). The article then discusses 
Congress' power to enforce its subpoenas through contempt 
proceedings (Section III). The subsequent sections are devoted 
to a discussion of the few protections available to the 
unfortunate citizen who becomes the object of Congressional 
curiosity, including defenses arising from procedural 
irregularities in issuing the subpoena, a witness' unintentional 
failure to comply, and those few instances in which the witness 
is sheltered by a constitutionally-based or common law 
privilege (Section IV). The final section discusses a mechanism 
for those instances in which all else fails and the witness must 
comply with the Congressional subpoena, and how the witness 
can at least get Congress to close its doors and keep out the 
television cameras (Section V). 
I. CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENA RULES 
Congress conducts its investigative work through its 
standing and special committees and subcommittees. The 
subpoena rules of each committee vary but are generally 
consistent with those established in the House and Senate 
Rules. 
A. Senate Subpoena Power 
The Senate's broad authority to subpoena witnesses and 
documents is set forth in rule XXVI 'li 1 of the Standing Rules 
of the Senate ("Senate Rules"): 
Each standing committee, including any subcommittee of any 
such committee, is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit 
and act at such times and places during the sessions, recess-
the Congress has in conducting investigations. It is one of its fundamental, 
constitutional powers vested by the Constitution and one of the fundamental 
legislative purposes of the institution conducting such investigations." !d. 
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es, and adjourned periods of the Senate, to require by subpoe-
na or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the 
production of such correspondence, books, papers, and docu-
ments, to take such testimony and to make such expenditures 
out of the contingent fund of the Senate as may be authorized 
by resolutions of the Senate. Each such committee may make 
investigations into any matter within its jurisdiction, may 
report such hearings as may be had by it, and may employ 
stenographic assistance ... . 6 
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Senate Rule XXVI en 2 requires each of the standing com-
mittees to adopt its own procedural rules, which must be con-
sistent with the Senate Rules. This is done, to different de-
grees, in each committee. For example, the rules of the Senate 
Judiciary and Commerce Committees do not mention the sub-
poena authority of these committees. The Finance Committee 
rules, however, expressly provide authority to issue subpoenas 
through the Committee Chairman. Specifically, Rule I en 10 
states that: "subpoenas for attendance of witnesses and the 
production of memoranda, documents, and records shall be 
issued by the Chairman, or by any other member of the Com-
mittee designated by him."7 The Foreign Relations Committee 
rules also set forth that committee's subpoena powers, provid-
ing for depositions and document requests, and further requir-
ing that subpoenas be issued only upon a majority vote.8 
6. SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., AUTHORITY AND RULES OF SENATE 
COMMITI'EES, S. Doc. No. 20, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 209 (1990). 
7. !d. at 85. 
8. Specifically, rule 7 of the Foreign Relations Committee rules states: 
(a) Authorization. The Chairman or any other member of the Commit-
tee, when authorized by a majority vote of the Committee at a meeting 
or by proxies shall have authority to subpoena the attendance of witness-
es or the production of memoranda, documents, records, or any other 
materials. When the Committee authorizes a subpoena, it may be issued 
upon the signature of the Chairman or any other member designated by 
the Committee. 
(b) Return. A subpoena, for documents may be issued whose return 
shall occur at a time and place other than that of a scheduled Committee 
meeting. A return on such a subpoena or request which is incomplete or 
accompanied by an objection constitutes good cause for a hearing on 
shortened notice. Upon such a return, the Chairman or any other member 
designated by him may convene a hearing by giving two hours notice by 
telephone to all other members. One member shall constitute a quorum 
for such a hearing. The sole purpose of such a hearing shall be to eluci· 
date further information about the return and rule on the objection. 
(c) Depositions. At the direction of the Committee, staff is authorized 
to take depositions from witnesses. SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND 
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Additionally, the Senate Rules require that each witness 
who is to appear before the committee file a written statement 
of the proposed testimony before the committee.9 
B. House Subpoena Powers 
Like the Senate rules, the Rules of the House of Represen-
tatives ("House Rules") grant House committees and subcom-
mittees vast authority to issue subpoenas. Rule XI 'II 2(m) sets 
forth this subpoena power: 
(1) For the purpose of carrying out any of its functions and 
duties under this rule and rule X ... any committee, or any 
subcommittee thereof, is authorized 
(A) To sit and act at such times and places within the 
United States, whether the House is in session, has 
recessed, or has adjourned, and to hold such hearings, 
and 
(B) To require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attend-
ance and testimony of such witnesses and the production 
of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, 
papers, and documents as it deems necessary. The chair-
man of the committee, or any member designated by 
such chairman, may administer oaths to any witness. 
(2) 
(A) A subpoena may be authorized and issued by a com-
mittee or subcommittee under subparagraph (l)(B) in 
the conduct of any investigation or series of investiga-
tions or activities, only when authorized by a majority of 
the members voting, a majority being present. The pow-
er to authorize and issue subpoenas under subparagraph 
(l)(B) may be delegated to the chairman of the commit-
tee pursuant to such rules and under such limitations as 
the committee may prescribe. Authorized subpoenas 
shall be signed by the chairman of the committee or by 
ADMIN., AUTHORITY AND RULES OF SENATE COMMITTEES, S. Doc. No. 20, 
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1990). 
9. Specifically, Senate Rule XXVI CJ14(b) states that: "Each committee (except 
the Committee on Appropriations) shall require each witness who is to appear 
before the committee in any hearing to file with the clerk of the committee, at 
least one day before the date of the appearance of that witness, a written state-
ment of his proposed testimony unless the committee chairman and the ranking 
minority member determine that there is good cause for noncompliance." See 
SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., AUTHORITY AND RULES OF SENATE COMMIT-
TEES, S. Doc. No. 20, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 210 (1990). 
37] THE CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENA 
any member designated by the committee. 
(B) Compliance with any subpoena issued by a commit-
tee or subcommittee under subparagraph (l)(B) may be 
enforced only as authorized or directed by the House. 10 
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The rules of the various standing committees generally do 
not elaborate the subpoena power set forth in House Rule XI '1I 
2(m)(2)(A). Some, such as rule 21 of the Energy and Commerce 
Committee11 rules, expressly apply House Rule XI '1I 
2(m)(2)(A) with minor modifications. Others, such as the Gov-
ernment Operations and Judiciary Committees, do not mention 
subpoena authority. 
II. STRUCTURAL LIMITS To THE EXERCISE OF SUBPOENA 
POWER 
The House and Senate rules discussed above illustrate the 
broad authority of the Congressional standing committees to 
subpoena witnesses and documents. Far-reaching and intrusive 
Congressional subpoenas issued pursuant to this power have 
been repeatedly upheld by the courts under the Speech and De-
bate Clause of the Constitution. 12 In Eastland v. United States 
Servicemen's Fund, the Supreme Court stated that the Speech 
and Debate Clause "was written to . . . forbid invocation of 
judicial power to challenge the wisdom of Congress' use of its 
investigative authority."13 Under this view, the separation of 
powers doctrine prohibits the courts from interfering with 
Congress' legitimate exercise of its subpoena power to collect 
information pursuant to its legislative function. Accordingly, 
parties subject to a Congressional subpoena generally have 
little recourse to the courts. 14 
10. Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XI 'll 2(m). 
11. The Energy and Commerce Committee is the oldest standing committee in 
the House, with the broadest jurisdiction, including defense procurement, trade and 
finance. It is presently chaired by Rep. Dingell, an ex-prosecutor, who issues large 
numbers of subpoenas, aggressively takes testimony for long periods of time, and 
refuses to recognize the attorney-client privilege. See NEWSWEEK, Apr. 20, 1987, at 
50; Rochelle L. Stanfield & Timothy Noah, Coporate Watchdog, Big John's Preserve, 
NAT'L J., May 16, 1987, at 1265. 
12. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 
421 U.S. 491, 511 (1975). See also United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 388 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976). 
13. 421 U.S. at 511. Accord McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); In re 
Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1977); In re 
Motion to Quash Subpoenas and Vacate Service, 146 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Pa. 1956). 
14. See cases cited supra note 13. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. 
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There are, however, very narrow structural limitations on 
Congress' subpoena power, that, if exceeded, may provide a 
party with grounds to challenge a Congressional subpoena. 
Those limitations involve the jurisdiction of the committee, the 
pertinence of the request, and the committee's compliance with 
procedural rules. 
A. Proper Jurisdiction and Legislative Purpose 
The first limitation is that the subpoena must fall within 
the proper jurisdiction of the issuing committee or subcommit-
tee and have a legislative purpose. That is, a subpoena can 
only be issued where: 
(!)Congress has the power to investigate; 
(2)The Committee or Subcommittee has a proper grant of 
authority to conduct the investigation; and 
(3)The materials sought are pertinent to the investiga-
tion and within the scope of the grant of authority. 15 
Generally, the first requirement above is easily satisfied, 
because there is a presumption in the courts that Congressio-
nal committees will act properly and within their authority. 16 
However, the third requirement, that the testimony or materi-
als sought should be pertinent to the inquiry, has served as a 
basis for invalidating Congressional subpoenas. 17 For exam-
ple, in Bergman the Court held that a subpoena calling for 
"'any' and 'all' financial records from 1969 to date [which] 
might include records relating to plaintiffs' purely personal 
financial affairs,"18 was invalid in part, where the issuing sub-
committee only had general authority to inquire into housing 
for the elderly. The court reasoned that while the subcommittee 
may properly investigate nursing home profits, "a general in-
quiry designed to ascertain plaintiffs' personal wealth ... is 
not pertinent to the investigation .... "19 
In Watkins u. United States,20 the Court stated that 
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 773 (D.D.C. 1977); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979). 
15. See Bergman v. Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 389 F. Supp. 1127 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
16. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297 (D.C. Cir.), a{fd 548 F.2d 977 
(1976). 
17. See Moreland, supra note 5, at 230-42. 
18. Bergman, 389 F. Supp. at 1130. 
19. ld. 
20. 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957) (citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 
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where the information requested from a subpoenaed witness is 
"unrelated to any legislative purpose," the individual's constitu-
tional right to privacy outweighs the committee's interest in 
the information. Further, in Tobin v. United States,21 the 
Court held that the House Judiciary Committee's general au-
thority to investigate interstate compacts did not authorize the 
Committee to issue a "deep and penetrating" subpoena of all 
internal administrative documents of a specified entity.22 
B. Compliance With Procedural Rules 
The second limitation on Congress' subpoena power is that, 
for a subpoena to be valid, it must be authorized and issued in 
compliance with the procedural rules applicable to the commit-
tee or subcommittee. The court discussed this limitation in 
Exxon Corp. v. FTC: 
To issue a valid subpoena, however, a committee or subcom-
mittee must conform strictly to the [rules] establishing its 
investigatory powers, and only those parties expressly autho-
rized to sign subpoenas may do so validly. For example, 
where the [rules] granting subpoena power to a committee 
stated that subpoena would be issued only by the whole com-
mittee, not even the chairman himself could individually 
issue such a document ... 23 
As the House and Senate rules discussed above establish, 
House and Senate committees and subcommittees have the 
power to authorize subpoenas.24 However, courts have narrow-
(1880)). 
21. 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962). 
22. See also United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (the Court held that 
a House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities authorized to "conduct a study 
and investigation of . . . all lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, 
promote, or retard legislation" could not require a subpoenaed witness who sold 
books of a political nature to disclose the names of bulk purchasers who intended 
to further distribute the books). ld.; United States v. Patterson, 206 F.2d 433 (D.C. 
Cir. 1953) (the Court ruled that a House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities 
subpoena for the plans of certain organizations to influence legislation was beyond 
the authority of the Committee). 
23. 589 F.2d 582, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing Liveright v. United States, 347 
F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1965)). 
24. Prior to 1975, only certain House committees had the authority to issue 
subpoenas. The other committees and subcommittees could only issue subpoenas 
under authority of separate House resolutions. (H. Res. 988, 93d Cong., (1974) 
(enacted). Additionally, House subcommittees were not given authority to issue sub-
poenas until 1972. (H. Res. 5, 94th Cong., (1972) (enacted).[check cite] 
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ly interpreted the "number of persons entitled to issue subpoe-
nas."25 As the Court stated in Exxon: 
The principle is important that disclosure of information can 
only be compelled by authority of Congress, its committees or 
subcommittees, not solely by individual members; and only 
for investigations and congressional activities. Election to the 
Congress does not give an individual subpoena power over 
whatever information he may happen to be interested in, and 
particularly not over trade secrets, whose oftentimes enor-
mous value may be forfeited by disclosure to the public.26 
In Liveright v. United States,27 the court held that the 
committee rules place the power and responsibility of deciding 
who shall be subpoenaed with the subcommittee itself and not 
with any individual member. The court explained that the 
reason for this narrow interpretation of the right to issue sub-
poenas was to protect constitutional privacy rights from sub-
poenas issued by individual members. In Shelton v. United 
States,28 the court ruled that while subcommittee rules per-
mitted the chairman or "any other member of the subcommit-
tee designated by him," to issue subpoenas, this rule merely 
refers to the ministerial duty of subpoenas, and not to the dis-
cretionary function of actually calling witnesses or requesting docu-
ments.29 It should be noted, however, that while a valid sub-
poena requires formal committee authorization, motions to 
quash and other challenges to subpoenas may be heard by a 
quorum of one.30 
If a subpoena complies with the above two limitations, 
requiring pertinence and compliance with committee rules, the 
25. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (under Congressional rules, 
subpoenas can only be issued by committees or subcommittees collectively, and a 
single member, other than the chairman of a house committee, cannot issue a 
subpoena solely on his own initiative). 
26. Exxon, 589 F.2d at 582, 592-93. 
27. 347 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
28. 327 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
29. ld. at 606 (quoting Rule 2 of the Subcommittee). In 1977, the House 
amended Rule XI 'II 2(M)(2)(A) to allow for the delegation of the power to authorize 
subpoenas to the chairman of the full committee. The committee chairman is 
apparently the only individual in the House who can be delegated the authority to 
authorize subpoenas. H.R. Res. 5, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (enacted). 
30. See Bergman v. Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 389 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Flaxer v. United States, 235 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1956), vacated on 
other grounds, 354 U.S. 929 (1957); United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 965 (1952). 
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courts will not interfere with its enforcement. If the above 
requirements are not satisfied, courts generally will hold the 
subpoena invalid.31 However, even if a subpoena is invalid, 
courts generally will not interfere with its enforcement, prior to 
the deadline for compliance, by granting declaratory or injunc-
tive relief to a party subject to such a subpoena. Rather, be-
cause of jurisprudential and separation of power consider-
ations, courts generally will act to protect against invalid sub-
poenas only after Congress has brought contempt proceedings 
against a party who was served and refused to comply.32 
When this occurs, an invalid subpoena can be asserted as a 
defense to a prosecution for contempt of Congress.33 However, 
even if a subpoena is ruled invalid, Congress may cure the 
defect and reissue the subpoena in valid form, especially where 
the defect involves a technical breach of committee rules. 
III. CONGRESSIONAL CONTEMPT POWER 
It is well-established that failure to obey a subpoena or 
subpoena duces tecum issued by a House of Congress in fur-
therance of its legitimate activity-by failure to appear, re-
spond or answer questions after appearance-constitutes a 
contempt of that House of Congress.34 A prima facie case for a 
contempt offense is established when evidence is introduced 
that a witness was validly served with a subpoena and deliber-
ately fails to comply.35 
Case law indicates that contempt of Congress is punishable 
both criminally and civilly.36 With respect to criminal penal-
ties, Congress drafted a contempt statute in order to provide 
31. Bergman, 389 F. Supp. at 1130-31. But see United States v. Presser, 292 
F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1961), affd, 371 U.S. 71 (1962) (the court ruled that, where 
defendant knew Committee wanted documents and nevertheless destroyed them, 
validity of subpoena was not essential to prosecution for obstruction of justice (as 
opposed to contempt of Congress)). See also Kamp v. United States, 176 F.2d 618 
(D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 957 (1950) (the court stated that uncoopera-
tive witness may be in contempt of Congress even though no subpoena was 
served). 
32. In re Harrisburg Grand Jury--83-2, 638 F. Supp. 43, 50 (M.D. Pa. 1986); 
Pauling v. Eastland, 288 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 900 (1960). 
33. See Liveright v. United States, 347 F.2d 473, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Shelton 
v. United States, 327 F.2d 6(}1, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1963). But see Bergman, 389 F. 
Supp. at 1130 (committee allowed subpoenaed party time to file for court interven-
tion prior to deadline for compliance with subpoena). 
34. See McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960). 
35. See United States v. Hintz, 193 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Ill. 1961). 
36. See Moreland, supra note 5, at 242-48. 
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for proceedings in a judicial forum. This statute provides: 
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the 
authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to 
produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either 
House, or any Joint Committee established by a joint or con-
current resolution of two Houses of Congress, or any commit-
tee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or 
who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question perti-
nent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of 
a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 
nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not 
less than one month nor more than twelve months.37 
Congress also set forth rules governing how the contempt 
power it set forth in Section 192 would be enforced. The rules 
provide that the Senate or House, or when not in session the 
President Pro Temp or Speaker, must consider the facts and 
transmit them to the U.S. attorney for prosecution.38 This fur-
ther review of a committee's decision to prosecute for contempt 
was drafted as a "check against hasty action of the Commit-
tee."39 For the same reasons, only a grand jury, rather than a 
prosecutor, can decide whether to issue a contempt indict-
ment.40 
The House Rules also expressly provide that a House com-
mittee or subcommittee is required to seek authorization of the 
full House prior to enforcing a subpoena. The relevant rule 
expressly requires that "compliance with any subpoena issued 
37. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1992). See also United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200 (2d 
Cir.) cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952) (in situations involving repeated refusals to 
testify, a witness cannot be separately punished for each refusal). 
38. 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1992). Tha section provides: 
!d. 
Whenever a witness summoned as mentioned in section 192 fails to ap-
pear to testify or fails to produce any books, papers, records, or docu-
ments, as required, or whenever any witness so summoned refuses to 
answer any question pertinent to the subject under inquiry before either 
House . . . or any committee or subcommittee of either House of Con-
gress, and the fact of such failure or failures is reported to either House 
while Congress is in session, or when Congress is not in session, a state-
ment of fact constituting such failure is reported to and filed with the 
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House, it shall be the duty 
of the said President of the Senate or speaker of the House, as the case 
may be, to certify, ... to the appropriate United States attorney, whose 
duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action. 
39. See H.R. Rep. No. 1667, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935). 
40. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962). 
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by a committee or subcommittee ... may be enforced only as 
authorized or directed by the House."41 This generally re-
quires a House resolution authorizing committee or subcom-
mittee involvement in a contempt prosecution.42 While there 
is no rule on the matter, Senate Committees apparently must 
do the sameY 
In addition to criminal penalties, some courts have held 
that contempt of Congress can still be punished civilly by Con-
gress itself. These courts have stated that while Congress im-
plemented its authority in the criminal statute, it "did not 
impair or divest itself of its 'essential and inherent power to 
punish for contempt' which 'still remains in each House'."44 
IV. WITNESS PROTECTIONS FROM COMPULSORY PROCESS AND 
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS 
In view of the significant Congressional contempt power, it 
is important to review the protections available to a subpoe-
naed witness who is subject to an enforcement proceeding. 
There are essentially three defenses to, or protections from, a 
contempt proceeding.45 Specifically, failure to comply with a 
subpoena does not constitute contempt if the basis of the con-
tempt proceeding is invalid (such as when the subpoena is in-
valid), if the failure is not willful, or if such failure is protected 
by privilege.46 
41. Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XI '!! 2(m)(2)(B). 
42. See In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 589 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1979). 
43. See Wilson v. United States, 369 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Ex Parte 
Frankfeld, 32 F. Supp. 915 (D.D.C. 1940). 
44. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1308 (1977), 
citing In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 672 (1897). See also In re Harrisburg Grand 
Jury-83-2, 638 F. Supp. 43 (M.D. Pa. 1986). These courts have held that the 
criminal statute merely supplants Congress' contempt power: "Consequently, the 
same conduct before Congress can constitute both a criminal offense and civil 
contempt, punishable by civil contempt proceedings in the legislature and criminal 
prosecution in the courts, without any violation of the double jeopardy clause." In 
re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F.Supp. at 1308, citing Jurney v. 
MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 151 (1935). 
45. See United States v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1956). 
46. Of course, if refusal to comply is based on the privilege against 
self-incrimination, testimony can be compelled if immunity from prosecution is 
granted by the committee or subcommittee, as in the North hearing. See infra 
notes 61-78 and accompanying text. 
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A. Invalid Basis for Proceeding 
First, contempt proceedings may be ruled invalid in the 
following circumstances:47 
(a) if Congress did not have the power to investigate;48 
(b) if the prosecuting committee or subcommittee did not 
have proper jurisdiction or authority to conduct the original 
investigation under which the contempt prosecution arose;49 
(c) if the questions asked were not pertinent to the inqui-
ry;50 or, 
(d) if the prosecuting committee did not follow the applicable 
procedural rules during the investigation, such as rules gov-
erning subpoenas, the taking of testimony and executive ses-
sions. 51 
These bases for ruling the contempt proceedings invalid are, 
not surprisingly, the mirror image of the basic requirements 
identified by the court in Bergman for a validly issued Congres-
sional subpoena. 52 
47. See supra notes 12-26 and accompanying text. 
48. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
49. See Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966); United States v. Kamin, 
136 F. Supp. 791, 803 (D. Mass. 1956) (an investigation by Subcommittee of Gov-
ernment Operations Committee had no jurisdiction to investigate operation of 
private defense plant); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (an inquiry 
regarding private contracts and sales was outside jurisdiction of committee autho-
rized to investigate "lobbying activities," which Court held to mean "representations 
made directly to the Congress, its members, or its committees"). ld. at 44. 
50. United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953); Deutch v. United 
States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961); United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mass. 
1956). The requirement that a question be pertinent is a major element of a 
contempt offense, and the right of a witness to refuse to answer an impertinent 
question is not a personal privilege that can be waived if not asserted. Bowers v. 
United States, 202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Congress has a burden to explain to 
the witness that a question is pertinent and that despite the witness' objection, the 
committee demands an answer. Barenblatt v. United States, 252 F.2d 129 (D.C. 
Cir. 1958), affd, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 
(1957); Davis v. United States, 269 F.2d 357 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 919 
(1959). If challenged, Congress also must demonstrate the pertinence of a question 
to the court in a contempt proceeding. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 
(1962). A presumption of pertinency will not suffice. Bowers, 202 F.2d at 447. 
51. See Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963). But see United States v. 
Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mass. 1956) (the court ruled that committee's techni-
cal violations of procedural rules did not disturb contempt conviction, if such viola-
tion did not affect witness' refusal to comply with the subpoena). 
52. See supra notes 15-32. 
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B. Non-"Willful" Conduct 
A second defense to a contempt proceeding is that the 
refusal to comply was not willful. 53 In order to be "willful," the 
refusal need not be for a wrongful purpose, but instead need 
only be deliberate rather than inadvertent.54 However, to en-
sure that a witness' refusal is willful, a committee generally 
must propound the question and, after the witness' refusal, 
reject the refusal and permit the witness another opportunity 
to answer.55 
In this respect, it should be noted that a deliberate refusal 
to comply, either on grounds of privilege or invalidity, is made 
at the subpoenaed party's risk. If the grounds for refusal are 
not upheld in court, the subpoenaed party will be held in con-
tempt of Congress. The subpoenaed party's good faith reliance 
on legal advice is no defense to the act of deliberately refusing 
to comply with a subpoena.56 
C. Privilege 
The third and most important protection for subpoenaed 
witnesses is constitutional and common law privilege. While it 
is recognized that a Congressional committee's power to inves-
tigate is limited by a witness' constitutional rights, as a general 
rule, Congressional committees have refused to recognize that 
their investigative authority is limited by traditional common 
law privileges. 57 
53. See Moreland, supra note 5, at 240. 
54. Fields v. United States, 164 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 
U.S. 851 (1948). 
55. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); United States v. Kamp, 102 
F. Supp. 757 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955). 
56. See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); Carlson v. United 
States, 209 F.2d 209 (1st Cir. 1954); Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1937). 
57. Executive privilege also may be invoked to preclude witness testimony or 
the release of documents from the Administration to Congress. This very broad 
privilege will not be further examined in this article; for further information, see 
Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: 
The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461 
(1987); Stanley M. Brand & Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Prescrib-
ing a Prompt and Orderly Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative 
Demands Against Executive Branch Officials, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 71 (1986). 
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1. Constitutional protection 
There is no doubt that Congress' power to investigate, 
while broad, is limited by the protections afforded to indivi-
duals in the United States Constitution. This principle was 
defined by the Supreme Court of the United States in one of a 
number of cases arising out of hearings held by the Committee 
on Un-American Activities in the 1950's. In Watkins v. United 
States,58 Chief Justice Warren wrote: 
It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with 
the Congress in its efforts to obtain the facts needed for intel-
ligent legislative action. It is their unremitting obligation to 
respond to subpoenas, to respect the dignity of the Congress 
and its committees and to testify fully with respect to matters 
within the province of proper investigation. This, of course, 
assumes that the constitutional rights of witnesses will be 
respected by the Congress as they are in a court of justice. 
The Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations as to all 
forms of governmental action. Witnesses cannot be compelled 
to give evidence against themselves. They cannot be subjected 
to unreasonable search and seizure. Nor can the First Amend-
ment freedoms of speech, press, religion or political belief and 
association be abridged.59 
a. Fifth Amendment privilege. Of the constitutional 
protections identified by the Watkins court, the most frequently 
invoked in testimony before Congress is the Fifth Amendment's 
privilege against self-incrimination.60 The relevant clause of 
the Fifth Amendment provides: "Nor shall [any person] be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law ... .''61 
As early as 1879, the House of Representatives recognized 
that this privilege could be invoked by a witness testifying 
before Congress even though a Congressional investigation is 
not a "criminal case."62 No Congressional committee or any 
58. 354 u.s. 178 (1957). 
59. ld. at 187-88 (emphasis added). 
60. The First Amendment privilege also is available to protect witnesses in 
limited circumstances. See Moreland, supra note 5, at 260-65. 
61. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
62. 4 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 9 at 86 & 
n.20. 
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court presiding over a Congressional contempt proceeding has 
challenged the principle that Congress' power to investigate is 
limited by the witness' Fifth Amendment rights. Rather, the 
controversy surrounding a witness' invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment usually involves the question of whether the Fifth 
Amendment is appropriate in a particular situation, whether 
the Amendment has been invoked properly, or whether the 
privilege has been waived. 63 The best general statement of 
the availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege in a Con-
gressional hearing was announced in United States v. Jaffe:64 
[P]rivilege ... may not be used as a subterfuge .... 
The privilege may only be asserted when there is reasonable 
apprehension on the part of the witness that his answers 
would furnish some evidence upon which he could be convict-
ed of a criminal offense against the United States, or which 
would lead to a prosecution of him for such offense, or which 
would reveal sources from which evidence could be obtained 
that would lead to such conviction, or to prosecution therefor. 
[A] witness is not bound to explain why answers to apparent-
ly innocent questions might tend to incriminate him when 
circumstances render such reasonable apprehensive evident. 
[O]nce it has become apparent that the answers to a question 
would expose a witness to the danger of conviction or prose-
cution, wider latitude is permitted the witness in refusing to 
answer other questions upon the ground that such answers 
would tend to incriminate him.65 
The conflict between the witness' constitutional rights and 
Congress' power to investigate has been the subject of Con-
gressional concern for some time. While Congress has over the 
years attempted to strike the proper balance between these 
two competing interests, and while questions of whether the 
Fifth Amendment protection applies in a particular case arise 
from time to time, Congressional committees universally ac-
knowledge the Fifth Amendment as limiting their power to 
investigate.66 In fact, Representative John Dingell (D-MI) 
63. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955) (an assertion of privi-
lege proper because answer to question whether congressional witness was a 
member of the Communist Party might incriminate); Emspak v. United States, 349 
U.S. 190, 197, 199 (1955) (held privilege not waived and 58 questions regarding 
witness' association with Communists were within scope of privilege). 
64. 98 F. Supp. 191 (D.D.C. 1951). 
65. ld. at 19:-l-94. 
66. See Moreland. supra note 5, at 253-60. 
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was criticized recently for requiring financier Michael Milken 
to assert repeatedly in a public hearing the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. 67 
b. Grant of immunity and compelled testimony. In view 
of the well-established right of witnesses to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Congress 
passed a limited witness immunity statute68 as part of the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.69 This statute contains 
a provision setting forth the rules for compelling testimony 
through a grant of immunity, which applies generally to wit-
nesses in federal court and administrative proceedings, as well 
as congressional proceedings. 70 This provision states that a 
witness can be compelled or ordered to testify, provided an 
order is obtained from a federal district court, and provided: 
"no testimony or other information compelled under the order 
(or any information directly or indirectly derived from such 
testimony or other information) may be used against the wit-
ness in any criminal case, except prosecution for perjury, giv-
ing a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the 
order.'m 
The federal immunity statute also sets forth a provision, 
specific to congressional proceedings,72 elaborating the proce-
67. See James Hamilton, Take One, Take Two, Take the Fifth: In Congress, 
Rights Become Rites, LEGAL TIMES, May 9, 1988, at 14. Critics point out that 
Dingell, having received from Milken a sworn affidavit that he would assert the 
Fifth Amendment if asked any questions in a public hearing, should not have 
required Milken to appear, or should at least have held an executive (closed) 
session to avoid forcing Milken to invoke the Fifth Amendment in public. !d. See 
infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text. 
68. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988). Prior to 1970, Congress had passed a number of 
immunity statutes, beginning with the Act of 1857 and including the Compulsory 
Testimony Act of 1954, which applied to Congressional hearings. See Moreland, 
supra note 5, at 253-57. 
69. PuB. L. No. 91-452, § 6002, 84 Stat. 922, 927 (1970-71). 
70. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988). 
71. /d. 
72. 18 U.S.C. § 6005 (1988). Provisions for obtaining a compulsion order in 
court and in administrative proceedings are set forth at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6003-04 
(1988). In one of the first congressional actions under the statute, in the Watergate 
hearings in June of 1973, U.S. District Judge Sirica denied special prosecutor 
Archibald Cox's request for delay, and ordered a grant of immunity to White 
House counsel John Dean and aide Jeb Magruder. Dean had earlier argued unsuc-
cessfully for a grant of total or transactional immunity. Both Dean and Magruder 
were later convicted of crimes related to the subjects on which they testified. The 
Iran-Contra Puzzle, CONG. Q. INC., (1987) at 60. 
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dures by which Congress may obtain an order from a federal 
District Court compelling the testimony of a witness who has 
refused to comply with a Congressional request on the basis of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.73 
The fundamental tension inherent in the immunization of 
witness testimony is that it may have the unintended effect of 
allowing a witness guilty of wrongdoing to avoid prosecu-
tion. 74 In view of this concem, Congress sought to strike a 
balance between a witness' Fifth Amendment rights and the 
societal interest in investigating, and, prosecuting wrongdo-
ing. 75 Thus, the federal immunity statute was intended to 
provide only "use immunity"76 which excludes from subse-
quent criminal prosecution a witness' compelled testimony or 
any evidence derived from that testimony, but which does not 
prevent prosecution for offenses related to the subject matter 
of the witness' testimony if the government has independent 
evidence of the crime. 77 The granting of use immunity under 
this statute,78 and in particular, with respect to witnesses in 
73. The Iran-Contra Puzzle, CONG. Q. INC., (1987) at 60. Under this provision, 
a majority of either House of Congress, or in the case of Committee or Sub-com-
mittee proceedings, a two-thirds majority, must approve a request to the federal 
District Court for an order compelling testimony. 18 U.S.C. § 6005(a), (b) (1988). If 
these conditions are satisfied, the court must grant the Immunity Orders request-
ed, and may not judge the wisdom of granting immunity. See In re Application of 
U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1270 
(D.D.C. 1973). Notice must be given to the Attorney General (or independent 
counsel) ten days prior to such request. 18 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(3) (1988). The Depart-
ment of Justice may waive this notice requirement. In re Application of U.S. 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 655 F.2d 1232 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981). 
74. See Moreland, supra note 5, at 253-54. 
75. !d. See also United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974) (sections 6001-6005 are an accommodation between 
the Government's right to compel testimony and the Fifth Amendment privilege to 
remain silent); United States v. Pelion, 475 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 
620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980) (under the statute, immu-
nity precludes only the Government's use of testimony and the witness may still 
be prosecuted if the prosecution can prove its case independently the witnesses 
own testimony). 
76. "Use immunity" is to be distinguished from "transactional immunity," which 
provides a witness with complete immunity from prosecution for the offense related 
to the subject matter on which the witness is compelled to testify. In re Kilgo, 484 
F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973); Block v. Consino, 535 F.2d. 1165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 u.s. 861 (1976). 
77. United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983); Goldberg v. United 
States, 472 F.2d fi13 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Quatermain, 467 F. Supp. 
782 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
78. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
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congressional proceedings, has been upheld as constitution-
al. 79 The obvious risk of compelled testimony under the use 
immunity provision is that in highly publicized trials, witness-
es prosecuted following compelled testimony may not receive a 
fair and impartial trial. The Supreme Court in Kastigar v. 
United States was aware of this risk, stating that the prosecu-
tion must rely entirely on independent evidence of wrongdoing 
in a trial of a witness whose testimony was compelled.80 
Moreover, the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Colum-
bia, in United States v. North,81 expanded the application of 
the immunity granted under the statute in an effort to avoid 
this risk. The North Court held that the prosecutors82 must 
establish that all prosecution witnesses are in no way influ-
enced by a defendant's compelled testimony- a broadening of 
what is considered the "use" of a defendant's immunized testi-
mony.83 The same court made substantially the same ruling 
in United States v. Poindexter,84 leading the reversal of the 
defendant's conviction on all counts because the Independent 
Counsel failed to demonstrate that the defendant's compelled 
testimony was not used against him. 
The North and Poindexter decisions clearly make the pros-
ecution of witnesses who have been compelled to testify more 
difficult. Some commentators assert that it will have a chilling 
effect on Congress' use of its power to investigate. 85 Never-
79. In re Application of U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign 
Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1270 (D.D.C. 1973). 
80. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444. 
81. 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990), modified and rehearing denied in part, 920 
F.2d 940 (1991) (en bane). 
82. The prosecution in the North case was led by an independent counsel, Law-
rence Walsh, who was appointed by Congress. Congress' authority to appoint a 
prosecutor was challenged unsuccessfully as an unconstitutional violation of the 
separation of powers requirement. 
83. North, 910 F.2d at 851-54. In the North case, the D.C. Circuit held that, to 
ensure the prosecution (independent counsel) made no use of immunized congres-
sional testimony and based its case solely on independent evidence, the trial court 
must conduct a "Kastigar inquiry" or hearing. In such a hearing, termed after the 
Supreme Court case Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the trial court 
must analyze whether the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses was influenced 
"directly or indirectly" by the compelled testimony. The burden is on the prosecu-
tion to prove that its witnesses did not draw upon or refresh their memory based 
on the immunized testimony; the culpability of the prosecution in tainting testimo-
ny is deemed irrelevant. ld. 
84. 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
85. See Joseph I. Liberman, After the North Case: How Do We Get at the 
Truth?, WASil. POST, Sept. 24, 1991, at A23. in which Senator Lieberman CD-CT) 
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theless, it appears to be absolutely appropriate, in instances 
where witnesses are forced to surrender their constitutional 
privilege, to place the burden on the prosecutor to ensure that 
the criminal case against the witnesses is in no way tainted by 
their compelled testimony. Further, Congress should ensure 
that the extraordinary measure of compelling testimony is 
reasonably and prudently invoked. In the words of Iran-Contra 
prosecutor Lawrence Walsh, the outcome of United States v. 
North was "a very serious warning that immunity is not to be 
granted lightly ... [Congress has] the very broad political 
responsibility for making a judgment as to whether it is more 
important that the country hear the facts quickly, or that they 
await a prosecution."86 
c. Fourth Amendment privilege. In addition to the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Fourth 
Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and 
seizures has been recognized as providing some protection to 
witnesses whose papers have been subpoenaed by Congress. In 
Strawn v. Western Union,87 the first case to challenge a 
broadly-worded congressional subpoena, the Supreme Court of 
the District of Columbia enjoined enforcement of a senate 
committee's subpoena requiring the Western Union Telegraph 
Company to supply all copies of all telegrams which were sent 
by or received by a certain law firm during 1935. The court 
stated that, as a result of the North decision, "the right to prosecute a witness 
granted use immunity has become an illusion; it is tantamount to waiving prosecu-
tion, no matter how heinous the crime ... the incentive given to clever defense 
lawyers is clear: simply show your client's immunized testimony to every possible 
prosecution witness and-bingo-they're tainted and useless in court." !d. The 
Senator went on to state that "Congress will be forced to forgo shedding the light 
of public inquiry on major cases of fraud and abuse if it doesn't want to endanger 
the prosecution of those who committed crimes." !d. 
86. Haynes Johnson et al., North Charges Dismissed at Request of Prosecutor, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1991, at Al. It is interesting that at the time immunity 
was granted, Senator Rudman (R-NH), vice chairman of the Senate investigating 
committee, stated that "Nobody is really avoiding prosecution by what we're doing." 
The Iran-Contra Puzzle, CONG. Q. INC., (1987) at 61. After the North case, howev-
er, Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN), who chaired the House Investigation Com-
mittee in the Iran-Contra hearings, stated that "I think the lesson is that the Con-
gress, when they grant immunity now, must be very cautious in doing so because 
doing so probably defeats any criminal prosecutions." !d. He also stated that "ithas 
always been my view that the policy questions exceeded in importance the question 
of individual criminal liability, and I do not think Congress made a mistake in 
granting that immunity." 
87. a U.S.L.W. 646 (S.C.D.C. Mar. 11, 1936) (unreported decision). 
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held that such a subpoena went far beyond any legitimate 
exercise of the right of the subpoena duces tecum. 88 
Since this initial challenge, other courts have held that 
the Fourth Amendment limits Congress' power to subpoena 
documents.89 Note, however, that to obtain a restraining or-
der against the enforcement of a subpoena on Fourth 
Amendment grounds, the complaining witness' objections must 
be raised in a timely manner.90 
Although these cases demonstrate that congressional sub-
poenas which are overly broad91 or which are unrelated to 
the purpose of the committee's investigation92 may be chal-
lenged under the Fourth Amendment, it must be noted that 
the likelihood of success of such a challenge is small. Even 
congressional subpoenas drafted in broad terms are likely to 
be considered valid if they relate to a legitimate investigatory 
purpose. 93 In addition, there is no reason why a congressional 
committee could not revise its subpoena if an objection is 
raised. 
2. Common Law Privileges 
In contrast to the consensus that the Constitution protects 
witnesses testifying before a Congressional committee, the 
witness' ability to invoke common law or statutory privileges 
as a basis for resisting compulsory disclosure is controversial 
and unsettled. As discussed below, neither Congress nor the 
courts have expressly decided whether Congress' power to 
investigate is limited by these privileges, and a number of 
influential members of the current Congress have expressly 
88. Moreland, supra note 5, at 226. 
89. See United States v. Groves, 18 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Pa. 1937) (dictum that 
broadly-worded subpoena amounting to "fishing expedition' is an encroachment 
upon defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment); Nelson v. United States, 
208 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (the documentary evidence obtained by congressional 
committee representative while in the home of congressional witness suppressed). 
90. See Hearst v. Black, 87 F.2d 68, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1936); United States v. Bry-
an, 339 U.S. 323 (1950). 
91. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. 
93. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (a 
subpoena for any and all records appertaining to or involving the account or 
accounts of [USSF] issued by a congressional subcommittee which had been autho-
rized by the Senate to "make a complete study of the 'administration, operation, 
and enforcement of the International Security Act of 1950'" was valid). !d. at 506 
(citation omitted). 
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rejected any such limitation. 
Of the common law witness protections, the two most 
relevant are those applying to an attorney testifying before a 
congressional committee-the attorney-client privilege and the 
qualified immunity for attorney-work product. Each of these is 
discussed in turn below. 
a. Attorney-Client privilege. The courts have traditional-
ly protected communications between an attorney and client 
from compulsory disclosure in judicial proceedings. The mod-
ern rationale for this privilege is that effective legal represen-
tation requires complete honesty and frankness by the client, 
and that this is unlikely without a rule protecting from disclo-
sure certain communications between an attorney and cli-
ent.94 While there is little disagreement on the propriety of 
protecting certain attorney-client communications for these 
reasons, the scope of the privilege, that is, which communica-
tions qualify for the privilege, has never been settled defini-
tively. In its most standard formulation, the privilege provides: 
1) where legal advice of any kind is sought; 
2) from a professional legal advisor in his/her capacity as 
such; 
3) the communications relating to that purpose; 
4) made in confidence; 
5) by the client; 
6) are at the client's instance permanently protected; 
7) from disclosure by the client or by the legal advisor; 
8) unless the protection is waived.95 
There is ample case law in the state and federal courts on 
each element of the privilege.96 
The case law and the written authority demonstrate that 
the privilege applies with equal force to both oral and written 
communications.97 The clearest case arguing for the equal 
94. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); John Henry 
Wigmore, 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2291, at 545 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (herein-
after WIGMORE]. 
95. WIGMORE, supra note 94, § 2292 at 554; United States v. El Paso Co., 682 
F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1982). 
96. See, e.g., 40 FED. PRAC. DIG. 3D, Federal Civil Procedure § 1600.1 (1975); 28 
U.S.C.A. Rule 501 nn. 61-310 (Federal Rules of Evidence). 
97. See, e.g., Edward W. Cleary, et al., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 89, at 184 
(2d ed. 1984). 
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application of the privilege to documents is that in which the 
client writes a letter to the lawyer containing exactly the same 
information that the client could have disclosed orally. In this 
case, the means of transmission should not, and will not, affect 
the availability of the privilege. However, the extension of the 
privilege to all documents sent by a client to a lawyer would 
present an obvious method for avoiding the disclosure of docu-
ments. A person wanting to prevent disclosure of sensitive 
documents could simply ship them to the lawyer and claim 
that they are privileged. In order to avoid this subterfuge, the 
courts have held that the availability of the privilege in such 
cases will depend on the status of the documents in the client's 
hands; if a document would be subject to an order for produc-
tion if it were in the hands of the client, it will be equally 
subject to such an order if it is in the hands of his attorney.98 
The fact that the documents are sent to the attorney is irrele-
vant. 
The case law and the general description above illustrates 
that the attorney-client privilege is not easily asserted. The 
availability of the privilege to protect statements or documents 
in each case depends on an analysis of the factual situation in 
which the communications are made. A completely separate 
question is whether the privilege, even if available, will be 
accepted by a congressional committee as a basis for withhold-
ing testimony or documents. A review of the commentary and 
some of the congressional investigations99 reveals that while 
the attorney-client privilege has been raised a number of 
times, neither Congress nor any court has ever decided wheth-
er the attorney-client privilege is a limitation on Congress' 
investigative powers. 
From its earliest cases, Congress avoided taking any de-
finitive position as to whether the privilege limits its investi-
gative powers. 100 The applicability of common law privileges 
98. !d. § 89, at 185 (and cases cited); WIGMORE, supra note 94, § 2307, at 
591-93. 
99. See Thomas Millet, The Applicability of Evidentiary Privileges for Confiden-
tial Communications Before Congress, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 309 (1988); Jona-
than P. Roch, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Congressional Investigations, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 145 (1988); James Hamilton, Attorney-Client Privilege in Congress, 
12 LITIGATION No. 2 at 3; Moreland, supra note 5, at 265-68. 
100. For example, during the congressional hearings accompanying the im-
peachment proceedings of Andrew Johnson in 1868, a House Committee investigat-
ed the activities of Charles W. Woolley, a lawyer suspected of bribing certain Sena-
tors. Mr. Woolley refused to answer the Committee's questions regarding his 
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was called into question more recently during the hearings 
held in the 1950s by the Committee on Un-American Activi-
ties. In an apparent attempt to remove any doubt about the 
applicability of the common law privileges in congressional 
proceedings, Senate Resolution 256 was introduced as an 
amendment to the Senate Rules which would explicitly recog-
nize these privileges. However, the Senate did not adopt the 
resolution, and avoided the issue by declaring that a rule was 
not necessary. 101 
The most extensive discussion of the application of the 
attorney-client privilege in congressional investigations oc-
curred in the context of the recent contempt proceedings 
against Ralph and Joseph Bernstein, both of whom allegedly 
had acted as agents of President Ferdinand Marcos of the 
Philippines in certain real estate investments. Joseph 
Bernstein, an attorney, refused to answer the committee's 
questions regarding his dealings with Marcos on the basis that 
the communications were privileged as attorney-client com-
munications. Mter considering the extensive legal memoranda 
submitted on the issue, 102 the subcommittee voted to report 
contempt resolutions against the Bernsteins, which were sub-
sequently ratified by the full committee. On February 27, 
1986, the entire House of Representatives-for the first time 
in more than a century--held a lawyer in contempt of Congress 
business dealings, and the Committee then cited Woolley for contempt and in-
troduced a resolution to arrest and hold him in the Capitol until he answered the 
questions. While various views of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege 
were offered during the floor debate, the House eventually adopted the contempt 
citation on the grounds that Woolley had not met his burden of showing that the 
communications he sought to protect came within the traditional scope of the 
privilege. See Millet, supra note 99, at 312. 
101. With few exceptions, it has been Committee practice to observe the testi-
monial privileges of witnesses with respect to communications between clergymen 
and parishmen, doctor and patient, lawyer and client, and husband and wife. 
Controversy does not appear to have arisen in this connection. While the policy 
behind the protection of confidential communications may be applicable to legisla-
tive investigations as well as to court proceedings, no rule appears to be necessary 
at this time. Millet, supra note 99, at 316. 
102. The Congressional Record contains memoranda submitted in favor of the 
privilege from the Bernstein's own counsel, from Professor Dershowitz of Harvard 
University, and from James Hamilton. Memoranda arguing against the privilege 
were submitted by the General Counsel of the Clerk, by Professor Stephen Gillers 
of the New York University Law School, and by the American Law Division of the 
Congressional Research Service. 132 CONG. REC. H676, H679, H681, H694, H693 
(daily ed. Feb. 27, 1986). 
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after rejecting his claim of attorney-client privilege. 103 
As in othe.r cases, Congress avoided the general issue of 
the availability of the attorney-client privilege and instead 
asked the prosecutor to proceed "on the primary ground ... 
that the claim of privilege would not have been upheld even in 
a court."104 However, this case is different than the others 
because of the extensive legal memoranda presented (and 
reprinted in the Congressional Record) on the issue of the 
viability of the privilege before Congress. 105 
In reaction to the congressional ambivalence and the in-
creasing frequency of congressional investigations, the Ameri-
can Bar Association in August 1988 adopted Guidelines Re-
garding the Rights of Witnesses in Congressional Investiga-
tions. Guideline No.2 provides: 
Witnesses in Congressional proceedings shall have the privi-
leges in connection with their appearance which are recog-
nized by the courts of the United States in Administrative 
and Judicial Proceedings, including the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination, and the attorney-client, 
work-product and spousal privileges. A witness shall not be 
compelled to exercise his or her Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination in a public proceeding where the 
witness has. provided notice to the Committee. 
There has been no reaction from Congress to the ABA Guide-
lines, and the ABA apparently has no present plans to seek 
legislation implementing the Guidelines. 
Regardless of the precise legal status of the attorney-client 
privilege before Congress, there remains a perception that 
Congress has discretion in deciding whether to recognize the 
attorney-client privilege. Indeed, in a 1983 committee docu-
ment, Congressman Dingell (D-MI) stated that: 
The position of the Subcommittee has consistently been that 
the availability of the attorney-client privilege to witnesses 
before it is a matter subject to the discretion of the 
Chair .... [A]lthough there are no judicial precedents direct-
ly on point, there is ample support for the view that the 
availability of the attorney-client privilege is a matter of 
discretion with the Subcommittee based on analogous judicial 
103. 132 CONG. REC. H697-98 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1986). 
104. 132 CONG. REC. H680 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1986). 
105. See sources cited supra note 93. 
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authority, coupled with the full investigative prerogatives of 
Congressional committees acting within their jurisdiction 
and for a valid legislative purpose, the custom, practice and 
precedent of both Houses of Congress and the British Parlia-
ment and the consistent practice of the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and lnvestigations. 106 
61 
b. The work product doctrine. Analogous to the per-
ceived need for frank communications between the attorney 
and client which underlies the attorney-client privilege is the 
need to protect materials produced by any attorney in prepar-
ing the client's case for trial. This policy gives rise to what is 
referred to as the "work product" doctrine, which provides that 
certain material produced by an attorney is immune from 
discovery in litigation. The "work product" which is protected 
from discovery covers "materials prepared by an attorney in 
anticipation of litigation including private memoranda, written 
statements of witnesses and mental impressions of personal 
recollections prepared or formed by attorney in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial."107 The work product doctrine thus pro-
vides a qualified immunity from discovery, which is only avail-
able if the various elements of the doctrine are satisfied. 108 
The most frequently litigated element of the work product 
doctrine is the requirement that the material be prepared "in 
anticipation of litigation." For example, the federal courts have 
consistently held that the work product doctrine does not cover 
materials prepared in "the ordinary course of business," but 
only those prepared for or in contemplation of litigation. 109 
As with the attorney-client privilege, neither Congress nor 
the courts have decided whether an attorney testifying before 
a congressional committee can resist compulsory disclosure on 
the basis that the document is protected by the work product 
doctrine. In 1985, the Subcommittee on Government Activities 
and Transportation of the House Committee on Government 
Operations rejected the assertion of the work-product privilege 
by an Amtrak employee attempting to withhold a document 
describing an equal employment opportunity investigation she 
106. See Hamilton, supra note 99, at 3. 
107. Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 61 F.R.D. 653, 658 (D.C.P.R. 1974). 
108. See generally FED. PRAC. DIG., supra note 96, at § 1600.2. 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 
501 nn. 311-360 (Federal Rules of Evidence). 
109. Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Fann 
v. Giant Food, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 593, 596 (D.D.C. 1987). 
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had conducted for the company counsel. The Subcommittee 
stated: 
[W]hen a claim of privilege that is not of Constitutional ori-
gins is asserted before a Congressional investigating commit-
tee, it is within the discretion of the committee whether to 
uphold the claim. In exercising that discretion, the Commit-
tee must weigh Congress' constitutional right to compel the 
disclosure of information needed for legislative and oversight 
purposes against the purpose served by the privilege. 110 
However, the Committee did not elaborate on its decision, and 
there does not appear to be any other discussion of the work 
product doctrine before any other congressional committee. 
V. CLOSED HEARINGS 
In addition to the witness protections discussed supra, 
subpoenaed witnesses also may take certain measures to mini-
mize the public nature of the hearing and consequent embar-
rassment and injury to reputation.m If a witness is subject 
to a valid subpoena to appear, there are provisions in both 
Houses through which a witness can request that a hearing be 
closed to the public. 112 
A. Senate Hearings 
The Senate Rules provide that in certain circumstances an 
investigative hearing may be closed to the public. Senate Rule 
110. Hamilton, supra note 99, at 3. 
111. Of course, the potential for embarrassment is no basis for refusing to testi-
fy. Section 193 of the Congressional Procedural rules enacted in 1926 state that 
"no witness is privileged to refuse to testify to any fact, or to produce any paper 
respecting which he shall be examined by either House of Congress ... upon the 
ground that his testimony to such fact or his production of such paper may tend 
to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous." 2 U.S.C. § 193 (1988). 
112. See Moreland, supra note 5, at 248. It should also be noted that the North 
case may have established a precedent for pretestimony negotiations between a 
subpoenaed witness and the issuing committee with respect to the parameters of 
the testimony. In the North case, North's counsel, Brendan Sullivan, exploited 
Congress' desire to have the hearing in public and to conclude the hearing at an 
early date; after threatening to contest the committee's subpoena, Sullivan won 
concessions on the duration of the testimony, the order of North's appearance, and 
the subject matter of the closed session testimony. Dan Morgan et al., Hill Conces-
sions to North Expected: Iran-Contra Leader Ensure Public Testimony, WASH. POST, 
June 23, 1987, at AI; Stephen Engelberg, Iran-Contra Hearings: The Non-Audience 
and the Audience; On First Day, Spotlight is on Lawyer's Sparring, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 8, 1987, at A10. 
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XXVI 'li 5(b) provides that a hearing "may be closed to the 
public on a motion made and seconded to go into closed session 
to discuss only whether the matters enumerated ... below 
would require the meeting to be closed."113 These matters in-
clude whether testimony: 
(3) Will tend to charge an individual with crime or miscon-
duct, to disgrace or injure the professional standing of an 
individual, or otherwise to expose an individual to public 
contempt or obloquy, or will represent a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of the privacy of an individual; 
(5) will disclose information relating to the trade secrets of 
financial or commercial information pertaining specifically to 
a given person if (A) an act of Congress requires the informa-
tion to be kept confidential by government officers and em-
ployees; or (B) the information has been obtained by the gov-
ernment on a confidential basis, other than through an appli-
cation by such persons for a specific government financial or 
other benefit, and is required to be kept secret in order to 
prevent undue injury to the competitive position of such 
person; or 
(6) may divulge matters required to be kept confidential un-
der other provisions of law or government regulations. 114 
Senate Rule XXVI 'li 5(c) provides that when a hearing is 
open to the public, it may be broadcast by radio or television 
or both. 115 Senate Rule XXVI 'li 5(b) also mandates that, if a 
committee determines in closed session that one of the above 
matters is present and requires a closed meeting, a majority of 
the committee must then vote in open session on the mat-
ter.116 Senate Rule XXVI 'li 5(b) does not clarify whether a 
subpoenaed witness can request that a hearing be closed pur-
suant to that rule. 
With respect to the individual committee rules, while the 
Judiciary Committee rules do not discuss the issue, rule 11 of 
113. SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., AUTHORITY AND RULES OF SENATE 
COMMITTEES, S. Doc. No. 20, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1990). 
114. !d. 
115. !d. At least one court has held that a witness' refusal to testify was justi-
fied when the press coverage was substantially disturbing to the witness. See 
United States v. Kleinman, 107 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1952). Other courts have 
rejected a refusal to testify on the same grounds. See United States v. Hintz, 193 
F. Supp. 325 (N.D. III. 1961); United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 34:1 U.S. 965 (1952). 
116. !d. 
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the Finance Committee rules states that "hearings shall be 
open to the public to the extent required by rule [XXVI 'll 5] of 
the Standing Rules of the Senate." Rule 2 of the Commerce 
Committee rules basically repeats Senate Rule XXVI 'll 5. Rule 
6 of the Foreign Relations Committee rules expressly states 
that a witness can request that a hearing be closed: 
Requests. Any witness called for a hearing may submit a 
written request to the Chairman no later than twenty-four 
hours in advance for his testimony to be in closed or open 
session, or for any other unusual procedure. The Chairman 
shall determine whether to grant any such request and shall 
notify the Committee members of the request and of his deci-
sion. 117 
The above rules indicate that a witness generally may 
request that a Senate committee hearing be closed to the pub-
lic. The Supreme Court has ruled that, once a witness makes 
such a request pursuant to a committee rule, the committee or 
subcommittee must consider the request as required under the 
rule, even if the request is made on the ground that the 
witness' reputation would be injured. If the committee fails to 
do so, the witness can refuse to answer without being in con-
tempt. This precedent apparently applies to both Houses of 
Congress. 118 
While Congressional Committees clearly must consider a 
request to go into closed session, it is uncertain how amenable 
committee members are to such requests. Some courts have 
held that they will not interfere with a determination by Con-
gress regarding how a hearing is to be conducted, provided the 
committee acts consistent with its own rules. 119 However, 
other courts have examined whether, even if a committee had 
considered closing a hearing in accordance with its own rules, 
such committee could properly have held the hearing in open 
session under the facts of the particular case. 120 
The recent confirmation hearings of President Bush's 
nominee to the Supreme Court, now Justice Clarence Thomas, 
focused public debate on whether the Senate should be more 
117. ld. 
118. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (196::1); United States v. Grumman, 
227 F. Supp. 227 (D.D.C. 1964). 
119. See United States v. Hintz, 193 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. III. 1961). 
120. See United States v. Grumann, 227 F. Supp. 227 (D.D.C. 1964); see also 
United States v. Watkins, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
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willing to close certain hearings pursuant to Senate Rule XXVI 
lj[ 5(b).121 While the Thomas hearings technically were not 
investigative hearings, but rather hearings held pursuant to 
the Senate's constitutional role of providing "advice and con-
sent" to the President's appointment of "officers of the United 
States," the hearings took on an investigative tone when alle-
gations arose that the nominee had sexually harassed a former 
employee. The hearings were broadcast live over the major 
television networks for several days, and the sometimes sexu-
ally explicit nature of the testimony caused not only commen-
tators, but also some Senators, to criticize the failure to close 
the hearings under Senate Rule XXVI lj[ 5(b). 122 
B. House Hearings 
The House Rules also provide that in certain circumstanc-
es investigative hearings may be closed to the public. House 
Rule XI lj[ 2(k)(5) provides for closed hearings: 
(5) whenever it is asserted that the evidence or testimony at 
an investigatory hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or 
incriminate any person, 
(A) such testimony or evidence shall be presented in execu-
tive session, notwithstanding the provisions of clause 2(g)(2) 
of this rule, if by a majority of those present, there being in 
attendance the requisite number required under the rules of 
the committee to be present for the purpose of taking testi-
mony, the committee determines that such evidence or testi-
mony may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any per-
son .... 
This rule also provides that no testimony or evidence taken in 
executive session may be publicly released without the 
committee's consent. 
Even when a hearing is open to the public, the House 
Rules provide for limitations on the broadcast coverage of the 
hearings. While at rule XI lj[ 3(e) the rules state that a com-
mittee can vote to permit the hearing to be broadcast, they 
also provide a subpoenaed witness with the right to prevent 
such broadcast, at 3(f)(2): 
121. See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler, Why Not Executive Sessions?, WASH. POST, Oct. 
17, 1991, at A25. 
122. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S14670-71 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991) (statement of 
Senator Bond). 
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(2) No witness served with a subpoena by the committee 
shall be required against his or her will to be photographed 
at any hearing or to give evidence or testify while the broad-
casting of that hearing, by radio or television, is being con-
ducted. At the request of any such witness who does not wish 
to be subjected to radio, television, or still photography cover-
age, all lenses shall be covered and all microphones used for 
coverage turned off. This subparagraph is supplementary to 
clause 2(k)(5) of this rule, relating to the protection of the 
rights of witnesses. 123 
With regard to the rules of specific House committees govern-
ing the broadcast of hearings, they generally allow for the 
coverage of hearings in accordance with rule XI 'II 3.124 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress has significant investigative powers. Through its 
subpoena power, it can compel citizens to appear, give testimo-
ny and produce documents, and Congress has the power to 
hold in contempt any citizens who dare to disobey. The exer-
cise of that power is arguably justified by Congress' need to 
have access to information of national importance, and to 
ensure that the information is brought swiftly before the 
American public. 
A witness compelled by a congressional subpoena has 
some protections. The issuance of the subpoena may suffer 
some procedural irregularity, or it may be too broad or beyond 
the reasonable scope of the issuing congressional body. Also, 
the witness may be sheltered by the same constitutional or 
common law privileges which operate in a court of law, or the 
witness may be offered immunity from prosecution. If all else 
fails, the witness can in appropriate circumstances avoid the 
indignity of giving compelled testimony on all the major televi-
123. During the subpoenaed testimony of Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham, 
before the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce 
Committee, Chairman Dingell granted Edward Bennett Williams' request that "all 
cameras and tape recorders be removed or shut off during the hearing, which last· 
ed 45 minutes." (At the hearing, Milken refused to answer questions under the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.) Nathaniel C. Nush, Panel 
Gets No Answers from Milken, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1987, at AI. 
124. Judiciary Rule V (hearings broadcasted if majority vote permits), Energy 
and Commerce Rule 20 (Hearings broadcasted unless majority forbids), and Govern-
ment Operations Rule 13. 
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sion networks by moving for a closed session. 
Despite the fact that Congress has been exercising its 
investigative role for almost as long as it has been in exis-
tence, recent events remind us that the rules of the investiga-
tive process, and the proper balancing of Congress' need to 
know and the citizen's right to due process, have not been 
resolved. The North and Poindexter cases raise the significant 
questions whether Congress' power should restrain its investi-
gative power when criminal prosecution is likely, and whether 
Congress' need to know simply must take a back seat to the 
citizen's right to due process in certain circumstances. The 
Senate Confirmation Hearings of Supreme Court Justice Clar-
ence Thomas raise other significant questions, including 
whether Congress should use the executive session more fre-
quently. These and other issues will only be resolved through 
the ad hoc, trial and error process which characterizes con-
gressional investigations, as Congress appears to have little 
interest in curbing its own power to investigate, issue subpoe-
nas, and enforce these subpoenas through contempt proceed-
ings, if necessary. 
